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THE LIABIITY OF
IN ISURANCE OOM:PA
IN CASES OF SUIUfl)M.
THz statistics of suicide show that its occurrence is subject to;
certain laws, and that future suicides may therefore be ascertaineti
in the same way as death from other causes, and the addition tobe made to the premium of a policy, when the undertaking of a&
insurance company is made to include death from suicide, may b&
estimated. The policies issued by some companies of the-United,
States cover risk of death by suicide, while it is expressly ecedw
"

by others.

At common law suicde ww" a crime and was vote with
punishment as such. It has, however,! never been enacted or
held that it is a crime or contrary to publia policy to enter intoa contract insuring the-payment of a certain. sum upon the ecwrence of death, even though caused by suicide
So far as the law or practicability is concerned, companies
may or may not assume the risk of death by suicide as they see
fit. Suicide is against good morals, and a company is justified
in refusing to insure against it upon the ground that although the
sum insured is not to be paid to the persow who commits the suicide, and he personally obtains no advantage by his act, yet the
company, by agreeing to make the payment to some one desigraaled in the policy, holds out a certain inducement to him to
commit the act. The punishment of -suicide at common lawdenying the body of the criminal Christian burial and the forVoL..
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feiture of his goods to the king, did not reach the criminal himself, for the very act of suicide placed him beyond the reach of
human punishment; still the punishment, such as it was, tended
no doubt in some degree to the prevention of the crime.
In the United States, life insurance companies are corporations subject to the provisions of their acts of incorporation and
those of the contracts into 'which- they have entered and their
other obligations. The policy-holders of a mutual company may
be considered abstractly as in equity the owners of the company's
assets, and as possessed of discretion and control over their disposition. The policy-holders of a life company are not, however,
practically acquainted with the principles and calculations of such
insurance, and do not ordinarily exercise any discretion in regard
to the application of the assets, nor delegate any to the directors.
When a mutual company, therefore, excepts suicide from the
risk insured against,.and the premiums to be paid by the members are assigned upon that assumption, and death when it occurs
is caused in the manner excepted, the payment of the sum assured
is not at all a matter of choice or discretion on the part of the
directors of the company. They have no right or power to pay
the sum so assured, as the premiums returned to the policy-holders
under the name of dividends would necessarily be affected thereby,
and the cost of insurance to other members increased. A greater
burthen than that stipulated for would for that reason be thrown
upon them, and their contract with the company be violated.
If suicide be regarded as a crime, as it was at common law, it
is obvious that a criminal intent is a necessary ingredient in its
commission as in that of any other crime. A person, therefore,
who kills himself without intending so to do, either by taking
poison instead of medicine, in handling a gun carelessly, or in
any other way, obviously does not commit suicide. Hence the
principle that the crime of suicide cannot be committed by a
lunatic, because a lunatic is incapable of forming a criminal
intent.
But although a criminal prosecution cannot be maintained
against such a person because of the absence of a criminal intent, the want of such an intent does not in itself constitute a
reason why a civil action should not be maintained against him.
When damage is occasioned by a trespass, or by the breach of a
contract on the part of a lunatic, it is more reasonable that it
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should fall upon the unhappy person by whom it has been caused,
even without guilty intent, than upon another; accordingly, civil
actions against such persons have been maintained: Bagdter v.
Portsmouth, 7 D. & R. 614; Weaver v. Ward, Hobart 134-;
(Jroas v. Andrews, Cro. Eliz. 622.
When companies do not assume the risk of death by suicide, a
proviso is inserted in their policies that the same shall be void in
case the insured "shall die by his own hand," or sometimes "in
case he shall commit suicide." The latter expression is somewhat
more technical than the former, and for some purposes may possibly have a different meaning; but whentit occurs in a policy
of life insurance, there would seem to be no difference between
them. Attempt has been made, it is true, to give a different
signification to the two expressions, even when occurring in policies of life insurance, as, for example, by WIGHTMAN and PoLLOcK, JJ., in Olift et al. v. SclswaMe, 3 Man., Gr. & Scott 437
(54 Eng. Com.. L. 437), but no adjudication appears to have been
founded upon the distinction.
The word suicide being derived from the two Latin words sui
and cmdo, is defined by Webster as meaning "self-murder, the
act of designedly destroying one's own life." The word therefore only implies of itself, etymologically, that the act of killing
designated by it was the proper act of the party, or, in other
words, that it was done by his own hand, wittingly.
The mind of a man who is insane is commonly said to be alienated. When crazy, he is said to be beside himself, that is, he is
no longer, strictly speaking, himself. Anything done by a man
when he is deprived of reason to such a degree as to be incapable
of an intelligent volition cannot in justice be said to be his own
act. When, therefore, a policy is made void in case the party
insured "dies by his own hand," and the party kills himself while
insane, the question that arises relates to the nature of the act,
and the gist of the inquiry is whether the killing was or was not
the proper act of the party himself.
Thus, in the case of Borradaile v. Hunter, 5 Man. & Gr. 639
(44 Eng. Com. L. 335), the action was upon a policy on the life
of Mr. Borradaile, in which' it was provided that the policy should
be void if the insured died by his own hand. The jury found
"that he voluntarty threw himself from Vauxhall Bridge with
the intention of destroying life; but at the time of committing
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the act he was not capable of judging between right and wrong."
Upon this verdict a judgment was directed for the defendant,
which was affirmed by the full bench. ElS wN, J., in giving
judgment, said: ",All that the- nature of the contract require.
is that the act of self-destruction should be the voluntary and
wilful act of a man having at the time sufficient powers of mind
and reason to understand the physical nature and consequences
of such act, and having at the time a purpose and intention to
cause his own death by that act."
In Olift et al. v. ,Shwabe, 3 Man., Gr. & Scott 437 (54 Eng.
Com. L. 437), the policy was to be void in case the insured
should "commit suicide." He died in consequence of having
voluntarily, and for the purpose of killing himself, taken sulphuric acid, but under circumstances tending to show that he was
at the time of unsound mind. It was held that all kinds of voluntar self-destruction were within the terms of the proviso, and
therefore that if the assured voluntarily'killed himself, it was immaterial whether he was or was not at the time a responsible
moral agent.
In these two cases the actions upon the policies, one of which
was made void in case the assured "died. by his own hand," and
the other in case he "committed. suicide," were not sustained,
beeause it appeared that, although circumstances tended to show
that the minds of the assured were at the time unsound, yet they
nevertheless, put an. end. to their lives voluntarily.
In the case of Bieaaed v. Farmers' Loan and Tru Co., 4
Eil 7a, the referees reported that the peamon insured "threw
himself into the Hudson river from the steamboat Erie while insane, for the purpose of drowning himself, not being mentally
capable at the time of distinguishing be tween right and wrong."
The finding of the referees, therefore, as held by WILLARD, J.,

who wrote an elaborate opinion and. gave the judgment in the
Court of Appeals, was not "that the intestate acted, voluntarily,
or that he knew the consequences of his act," and the judgment
was for the plaintiff.
In the case of Dean and Another v. American Mutual Life
.Ts. Co., 4 Allen 96, the policy was made void in case the insured
died "by his own hand.' and it was agreed in the case that the
insured caused his own death by cutting his throat with a razor,

but the plaintfis offered to prove that the act of killing was the
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irect result of insanity, that his insanity was what is called
sufi.dal depreuion, impelling the insured to take his own life, and
that suicide is the necessary and direct result of such insanity or
disease. The case was reserved on this offer and the plaintiffs
were nonsuited by the full bench upon the ground that "selfdestruction was intended by the plaintiff's intestate, he having
sufficient capacity at the time to understand the nature of the act1
which he was about to commit and the consequences which would
result from it."
The contract of a life policy is not impaired by these decisions,
but its true intent is carried out by them. "A party cannot be
said to die liy his own hand, in the sense in which these words are
used in the policy, whose self-destruction does not proceed from
the exercise of an act of volition, but is the result of a blind
impulse, of mistake or accident, or of other circumstances over
which the will can exercise no control." Per BIGBLOW, C. .,
Dean v. Am. Hut. Life Ins.. Co., 4 Allen 96.
In a subsequent case, decided by the same court: Cooper v.
Ie MassachuseW Mutual Life Ing. Co., 102 Mass. 227, Chief
Justice CHAPMAN, in giving the judgment of the court, said:
"We all think that, as applied to this case, there is no substantial
difference of signification between the phrases "1shall die by his
own hand," "shall commit suicide," and "shall die by suicide,"'
and that they include self-destruction under the influence of
insanity within the limitation above stated. In the present case
there was no offer to prove madness or delirium, or that the act
of self-destruction was not the act of the will, and intention of the
party, adapting the means to -the end, and contemplating the
physical nature and effects of the act. The insanity, therefore,
was not such as to take the case out of the proviso."
in the case of Coffey v. The Home L'fe Insurance Co., recently
tried in the Superior Court, New York, the insured was supposed
to have taken poison, but there was no positive proof of the condition of his mind at the time. So far as known, he entered the
state-room of the steamboat where the poison was supposed to
have been taken, in an entirely sound state of mind and body, and
there was no proof that this condition of mind was afterwards
changed.
MONELL, J., instructed the jury that, if the insured took poison
neither through accident nor mistake, but when his mind was
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either insane or at least in a state that rendered him incapable of
discerning between right and wrong, ihe 'act was not his own and
there was no breach of the proviso in the policy against suicide.
This ruling is not in accordance with the judgment of BIGELOW,
C. J., in the case above cited, nor with*the other authorities which
hold that when the act of suicide'is committed voluntarily and
intentionally and with a knowledge of the nature and consequences
of the act, it is the act of the party and comes within the terms
of the proviso, even although it was committed under an insane
delusion which rendered the party morally and legally irresponsible and incapable of distinguishing between right and wrong.
In the case above cited, MONELL, J., further charged that
when a man takes his own life, the presumption of law is that he
was at the time insane. The presumption of law, it seems to
us is, that he is ordinarily sane, and a man who takes the life
of another and alleges that he was at the time insane, must rebut
this presumption and show affirmatively that at the time when
he committed the deed he was insane.
In the very recent case of Terry v. Life Ins. Co., in the Circuit Court of the United States for the District of Kansas (to be
reported in Dillon's Circuit Court Reports), MILLER, J., stated
the doctrine as follows: "It being agreed that deceased destroyed
his life by taking poison, it is claimed by defendants that he ' died
by his own hand,' within the meaning of the policy, and that they
are therefore not liable. This is so far true, that it devolves on
the plaintiff to prove such insanity on the part of the deceased,
existing at the time he took the poison, as will relieve the act of
taking his own life from the effet, which, by the general terms
used in the policy, self-destruction was to have, namely, to avoid
the policy. It is not every kind or degree of insanity which will
so far excuse the party taking his own life, as to make the company insuring liable. To do this, the act of self-destruction must
have been the consequence of insanity, and the mind of deceased
must have been so far deranged as to have made him incapable
of using a rational judgment in regard to the act which he was
committing. If he was impelled to the act by an insane impulse,
which the reason that was left him did not enable him to resist,
or if his reasoning powers were so far overthrown by his mental
condition that he could not exercise his reasoning faculties on the
act he was about to do, the company is liable. On the other
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hand, there is no presumption of law, primd facie, or otherwise,
that self-destruction arises from insanity; and if you believe,
from the evidence, that the deceased, although excited, or angry,
or distressed in mind, formed the determination to take his own
life, because in the exercise of his usual reasoning faculties he
preferred death to life, then the company is not liable, because
he died by his own hand within the meaning of the policy."
In addition to the cases already cited, see St. Louis Mutual
Ins. Co. v. Graves, 6 Bush 268 ; .Dormay v. Borradaile, 10
Beav. 342; .stabrooke v. Union utual Life Ins. Co., 54 Me.,
224; Regina Morse v. The Louisana .Equitable Life Ins. Co.,
Chicago Chronicle, vol. VII, p. 187; 21 Pick. 162; 38 Me. 414;
11 Cush. 448; 4 Selden 299; 3 M. GY. and Scott 437; 3
Chitty's Crim. Law 160; 1 Russell on Crimes 9; Beck's Med.
Jur. 587.
The whole subject was very carefully considered by McKENNAN, J., in Nimieh v. Ins. Co., ante 101, and the conclusion very
forcibly laid down, after investigation of all the cases, that the
proviso against liability in case the assured "shall die by his own
hand," includes all kinds of voluntary self-destruction. If the
assured commit suicide, comprehending the physical nature and
consequences of his act and intending to destroy his life, the
policy is void, though he may not have been able to comprehend
the moral iaature of the act. And in an action on such a policy,
the burden is first on the insurer to show that the insured died by
his own hand; and this being done it then rests upon the plaintiff
to prove that the insured was of such insane mind that he 'did not
commit the act with the knowledge and intent that it should result
in death.
It would seem, therefore, from the authorities above cited, that
the question is not precisely -whether a party at the time when he
committed suicide was or was not insane, but whether he had
sufficient reason to understand the physical nature and consequences of his act, and sufficient will to make the act voluntary.

J. F. LYMAN.

